Military letters, Military District of Minnesota, 1863 - 1866
Division of Archives & Manuscripts, Minnesota Historical Society

These letters pertain to military operations in Dakota Territory during the Civil War. They mostly concern military operations against the Indians. They are presented here for the use of NDGenWeb researchers and are for noncommercial use only. Transcribed by Garnett J. Zsedeny.

HATCH'S INDEPENDENT BATTALION CAVALRY.
 

Organized at Fort Snelling and St. Paul, Minn, Companies "A," "B," "C," "D" July 25 to September, 1863. Company "E" mustered August 31, 1864, and Company "F" mustered September 1, 1864.

Companies "A," "B," "C," "D" march to Pembina October 5-November 13, 1863, and frontier duty there till May, 1864. Moved to Fort Abercrombie May 5-16, 1864. Assigned to duty Companies "A" and "B" as garrison at Fort Abercrombie, Company "C" at Alexandria and Pomme de Terre. Company "D" on patrol duty from Fort Abercrombie to Pembina. Companies "E" and "F" on frontier duty. Mustered out April 26 to June 22, 1866. Battalion lost during service by disease 21.

HDQRS, DIST. OF MINNESOTA, DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST
In the Field, Camp Rubles, Sauk Center, September 2, 1863.
 

MAJOR: I have the honor to report my arrival with the column at this post. A requisition has been made upon me by Senator Ramsey, commissioner on the part of the Government to negotiate a treaty with the Pembina and Red Lake bands of Chippewas, for an escort of two companies of cavalry and one of infantry, or a section of artillery, which I shall, of course, furnish. I shall detach the Tenth Regiment from the column there, with orders to scour the country along the line of posts to Fort Ridgely, and like orders to Colonel McPhaill will be sent him tomorrow, who, with five companies of cavalry detached to sweep the region from James River to Fort Ridgely, has doubtless reached that post, to visit the lines of posts south to the Iowa line. I have no reason to believe that the Indians will make any immediate raid along the border, but the people fear it, and the steps proposed will at least tend to reassure them. I have as yet received no dispatch from General Pope or yourself informing me of the receipt of my communications detailing the movements of my immediate command since the engagements with the hostile Indians. I trust to receive one very soon.

Major Camp, commanding Fort Abercrombie, has sent a special messenger to overtake me with information received from Captain Donaldson, who left Pembina on the 27th instant. Standing Buffalo, a Sisseton chief, who has uniformly been opposed to the war, had visited Saint Joseph with a few of his men. He reports that the Indians had recrossed the Missouri, and were now on the Missouri Coteau, near the scene of our first battle; that they intend to winter at Devil's Lake; that they are in a state of utter destitution, and 7 of the chiefs are desirous to make peace, and deliver up the murderers as the price for obtaining it. He represents the Indians to be very much frightened at the results of operations against them. They have, however, murdered 24 miners and 1 woman, who were on their way down the Missouri in a flat-boat. They acknowledge a loss of 30 men in the affair. A child was spared and retained as prisoner. Standing Buffalo further states that the Indians lost many drowned in crossing the Missouri when we were in chase of them, but they deny that they lost more than 13 in battle. The remarkable dislike to acknowledge how many are killed in action is characteristic of the race.

Forty-six dead bodies were found by my command, and doubtless many more were concealed or carried off and a large number were wounded, who were also transported from the field by their comrades. No blow ever received by them has created such consternation, and I trust and believe that it' General Sully takes their fresh trail inland, and delivers another stroke upon them, they will be for peace at any price.

I would respectfully suggest that Major Hatch's battalion be ordered to garrison a post at Saint Joseph or Pembina. They may do good service there. I shall probably leave the column in three or four days and proceed to Saint Paul, where I will again address you.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY,Brigadier-General, Commanding.
 

J. F. MELINE, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Milwaukee.
CONFIDENTIAL. HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE NORTHWEST
Milwaukee, Wis., August 29, 1863.

Hon. E. M. STANTON:
MY DEAR SIR:
The returning column of General Sibley reached Abercrombie, on the Red River of the North, on the 22d instant. At that point the force was divided into several bodies, which are now engaged in scouring the country down the Big Sioux and James Rivers, as far as the Iowa line, west of Kid River, and visiting the Chippewas at Red Lake, Otter Tail Lake, &c., east of Kid River, so that the whole Territory of Dakota, the northern and eastern portions of Minnesota, and, in fact, the whole country east of the Missouri, will be thoroughly visited and searched by our troops. I do not suppose that there are now ten hostile Sioux Indians east of the Missouri River. The large force of Indians, three times defeated and driven across the Missouri River, with the loss of all their Winter supplies of provisions and all the robes and furs for winter clothing, will not be able to return to Minnesota this winter, if ever, in a body.

General Sully reached the point on the Missouri where they crossed only a few days after, and will undoubtedly follow them up. As he has only cavalry, he can do this with the utmost rapidity. At all events, with a large cavalry force he has constantly interposed between the hostile Sioux of Minnesota (now south of the Missouri River) and the State of Minnesota, a glance at the map will exhibit how difficult, if not impossible, it will be for these Indians, in any numbers, to return to the Minnesota frontier this winter. I do not myself believe that there is the slightest likelihood that any Indian hostilities will occur again in that State from Sioux Indians. Small parties of eight or ten men may possibly, at great risk, traverse this long distance and commit some slight depredations; but with the mounted force patrolling the frontier the risk would be so great that I doubt if the Indians would even attempt this much. I propose to leave one entire regiment of cavalry (the Sixth Iowa) this winter on the Upper Missouri, at Fort Randall and Fort Pierre, as an additional precaution against any attempt of the Sioux to recross to the north (east) side of the Missouri River and again in the spring to visit the entire Indian Nation east of the Rocky Mountains. I also propose to leave in Minnesota an infantry regiment, distributed at the several posts along the frontier, with the mounted force of Hatch and 500 men of the Mounted Rangers to patrol the whole line of frontier between these stations. I do not myself believe such a force necessary, but in deference to the natural anxiety of the people after the atrocities of last autumn, and to give them the confidence necessary to induce them to remain on their farms, I think it well to keep such a force in Minnesota. All the rest of the force in that State I propose to send south within a few weeks.

I have thought it well to write you thus fully concerning affairs in Minnesota that you may not be misled by representations that will certainly be made to you. Of course, it is not necessary to tell you that there will be an influence used to keep all the forces in Minnesota; for what purposes you will be at no loss to understand, but I am glad to say that the persons who will thus seek to influence you are men of broken personal and political fortunes, who have objects in view very remote from the public interests. That you may realize what these motives are, and who are the persons, I enclose you some extracts from letters from Col. S. Miller, the nominee of the late Republican convention for Governor of Minnesota. He will be elected by a very large vote, and his opinions, therefore, are entitled to weight, as they will regulate his action as Governor. You will see at once the very same names as of the persons who have been infesting the War Department, urging movements or organizations, and finding fault with the conduct of military affairs in Minnesota. The difference is that, whereas a couple of months ago they were ridiculing the size of Sibley's expedition, and urging that the force was too large; that a small body of cavalry was sufficient; that Sibley would not see an Indian; that the Indians had divided into small parties, &c., now they complain and protest that the whole of the force in Minnesota is absolutely needed for their protection. Results have shown how far they were right two months ago, and it is not too much to say that they are quite as far wrong now in their new light. That the coalition between Wilkinson, an immaculate Republican, and Rice, an equally immaculate Democrat, is perfect, you will be at no loss to see from Miller's letters, and it is an alliance both political and financial. It will be utterly broken down in Minnesota at this election.

I enclose also the resolutions of the Copperhead convention at Saint Paul,(*) from which you will see that, properly manipulated, they resolve that the Indian war must be vigorously prosecuted, &c., which means that all the troops must be kept in Minnesota for the benefit of contractors. The Copperhead ticket will be beaten by 10,000 votes at least.

The alliance between Wilkinson and Rice is well enough understood in Minnesota. Wilkinson has been discarded by his party. He never had strength in it, and his election to the Senate, resulting from competition between prominent men of the party, surprised everybody. To his other disqualification’s and unpopularity, he has of late added bad personal habits, and in his desperation at the certainty of falling into total obscurity after his term expires, he has joined Rice, who is about as desperately broken down as himself. Whilst the one has political purposes, the other has financial, and my objection to Hatch and his organization is simply because Hatch is but an instrument of Rice, as he has been for years, and the organization is simply to be used to promote the effects I have named. I shall use Hatch's battalion, however, to the best purpose, replacing it by troops I shall send south. Of the cooperation of the Interior Department with these people, I dislike to speak. The history of the Indian agents and the management of Indian affairs on the frontier by the Indian Department would fully develop the reason of this alliance. Whilst Indian agents become rich, Indians become poor, dissatisfied, and hostile. It will not be difficult for you to arrive at these facts from anybody who lives on the frontier and is not connected with these transactions. Many very good and honest people are affected by the influences put in operation by these men, and the fear of Indian hostilities which they excite; but this will wear out in time. Last winter Rice threw the whole eastern frontier of the State into a paroxysm of alarm by telling them gravely, as he came through the country from Lake Superior, that, as soon as the snow fell, the whole Chippewa Nation would take the warpath and ravage the settlements, and I was overwhelmed with petitions for troops and cries of alarm, based on this statement. Its object was apparent, but there was not, and has not been, the slightest intimation of such a thing. The design is to keep up excitement and alarm, to continue the Indian war and to keep the troops in Minnesota.

I have thought it well that you should understand these things, so as to act advisedly upon the representations which will undoubtedly be made to you. I am confident that you will meet the case wisely, and I shall carry out your wishes with all zeal and energy.

Very truly, yours,
JNO. POPE.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,  General-in-Chief, Washington:
GENERAL: I have the honor to transmit, inclosed, a letter from General Sibley, dated Saint Paul, September 16, in which he reports the application for peace, unconditionally, of nearly the whole of the Sioux bands north and east of the Missouri River. I have directed him to send Hatch's battalion forthwith to Pembina, and open the communications with these Indians which he suggests, and in the manner in which he proposes. Such understandings with them will probably be made as will preclude all apprehension from them hereafter, and in the spring such treaties as may be deemed judicious can be made by the proper officers of the Government. I would only suggest in this view, and I do so with all urgency, that no purchase of lands be hereafter made, and no money annuities, under any circumstances, be accorded. Such conditions only exhibit (in the eyes of the Indians)weakness on the part of the Government, and lead necessarily to the very hostilities they are intended to prevent. They stimulate the cupidity of unscrupulous men, both traders and others, and finally lead to that system of swindling and wrong to the Indians in which have originated neatly all of our Indian difficulties Cease to pay money to the Indians, and the temptation of the whites to go amongst them and cheat them is nearly altogether taken away. I cannot too strongly set forth this view, and I urgently request that the Government will hereafter positively prohibit the authorized agents from introducing any article into treaties providing for money or any other annuities. The Indians now desire only peace, and let that alone be their inducement to keep peaceful. They now ask no more, and it will be altogether unwise to give more to a barbarous people, who are ruled alone by their fears. In this department I look upon the adoption of these views as vitally essential to our peaceful relations with the Sioux. No Indians of the Sioux Nation are now believed to be within 250 miles of any settlement in Minnesota, except the half-breed settlement at Pembina, and General Sibley is instructed, in his communications with them, to fix this limit to their approach, on penalty of at once renewing hostilities against them. General Sully's success on the Upper Missouri, pushed vigorously, as he has orders to do, will lead to the same results in that quarter; and I think it may safely be assumed that Indian hostilities, on any considerable scale hereafter, are transferred to the south side of the Missouri River. It is probable that it will be necessary, or at least advisable, that a strong cavalry force take the field next spring, and make a campaign against the Teton Sioux south of the Missouri River, by way of the Black Hills and Fort Benton.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. POPE, Major-General, Commanding.

MILWAUKEE, December 3, 1863.
Major-General HALLECK:

It has been determined to establish the post at Devil's Lake, but it cannot be done till spring. Hatch's battalion of cavalry winters near Pembina. Abercrombie will be moved northwest to James River in spring. Appropriations for posts on that frontier unnecessary; troops can build for themselves temporary barracks. Full details by mail.
 

JNO. POPE,
Major-general.

HDQRS. DIST. OF MINN., DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST,
Saint Paul, Minn., January 25, 1864.
Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE, Milwaukee:

GENERAL: I have waited for the reports of the agents dispatched by me, under your authority, to open communication with the upper bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians, before indicating a programme of military operations for the coming spring and summer. I have had the honor to furnish you from time to time with a statement of the condition of the Indians so far as that could be ascertained. No report has yet been received from Father Andre, who left Pembina several weeks since to visit the distant camps with a view to present to those not implicated in the massacres of 1862 the terms upon which peace would be vouchsafed to them by the Government.

The arrival of Red River half-breeds at Fort Abercrombie from Devil's Lake and the upper Cheyenne River, with the intelligence that the upper bands are encamped at points hundreds of miles apart, some within the British Possessions on the Assiniboine River, and most of the others on the James River, except two small camps of Sissetons at or near Devil's Lake, leads me to believe that the Red River half-breeds have succeeded in deterring them from submitting to the Government by representations that in such case they would be taken from their own country and placed upon an island in the ocean. It is for the interest of these half-breeds that non-intercourse between the Americans and the Sioux Indians should continue, as the trade with the latter is thereby secured to the British settlements exclusively. In fact, as I have already reported to you, the hostile Indians are directly aided and abetted 'by Her Majesty's subjects to so great an extent as to require the prompt interposition of the Government in insisting that a professedly friendly power shall not longer permit its soil to be a convenient refuge for these Ishmaelites of the prairies, where they can supply themselves with necessary articles, including munitions of war.

The remnant of the lower bands of murderers having been furnished with food and ammunition by the British authorities, as I have already informed you, it may be taken for granted that they will thereby be enabled to subsist themselves through the winter and their necessities will impel them to attempt new raids upon our settlements in the spring. Every precaution should be taken to guard these settlements against their insidious attacks in small parties, and the war be once more carried into the enemy's country as the most effectual protection to the frontier against any formidable demonstration by them. The most vigorous and effective means to put a speedy end to this Indian war, namely, an offensive movement, will prove in the end to be vastly less expensive than the assumption of a merely defensive attitude, which would indefinitely prolong hostilities and be most calamitous in its effects upon the prosperity of Minnesota, Iowa, and Dakota Territory.

To meet the new aspect of affairs, and to prevent, if possible, another ruinous stampede of settlers from the border, I beg leave to present the following plan of operations for the ensuing season:  First, I propose that the posts from Sauk Center to the Iowa line, established last season entirely outside of the line of settlements, shall be garrisoned by detachments of the Second Regiment Minnesota Cavalry, leaving a part of one regiment of infantry to occupy Forts Ridgely, Ripley, and Abercrombie. There should not be less than two companies at either of these posts. The whole twelve companies of the regiment of cavalry will be required to secure the extensive line from Fairmont to Alexandria from hostile incursions, and to perform the necessary escort duty.

Secondly, an expedition, to consist of fourteen companies of infantry three companies of cavalry, and two sections of mountain howitzers, should leave Fort Ridgely as soon as the grass shall be sufficiently long to subsist the animals, to beat up the camps of the prairie Indians, whether they may be found on the upper Cheyenne, at Devil's Lake, or on the Missouri Coteau. I feel quite certain that hostilities will be indefinitely prolonged, unless the recent reverses experienced by these prairie warriors are followed up vigorously by the Government forces, until the Indians are made to feel that there is no safety for themselves or their families except in their unqualified submission. It would have been imprudent to hazard an advance of 600 miles into the hostile country last season with a less force than composed the expedition; but now that the savages have experienced successive defeats in contending with disciplined troops, the number of companies I have specified may safely risk an encounter with any concentration of warriors north or east of the Missouri. The battalion under Major Hatch should be kept in position along the boundary line, to act in any emergency that may arise in that quarter.

To carry out this plan it will be necessary for you to procure the consent of the War Department to retain the three companies of Minnesota cavalry, now on their way to the State, who have reenlisted into the service. Though reduced in numbers these companies would be worth many times their own force of raw cavalry, and in no position could they confer more signal benefit to the Government than in this military district as a part of the proposed expedition. No other increase of force would in my judgment be requisite, but I consider that less than the number indicated for offensive and defensive purposes would be insufficient. I assume as a fixed fact that you will direct a formidable movement of troops up the Missouri River, to chastise the Teton Sioux, so as to render safe the emigrant route to the gold regions of Idaho. My information from the Missouri leads me to the belief that these Tetons have sent tobacco to the Assiniboines, Blackfeet, Crows, and other tribes with whom they have hitherto waged war from time immemorial, inviting them to form a general combination against the Americans as a matter of self-preservation. Should this prove correct these allied tribes can bring into the field 8,000 or 9,000 warriors, and sooner or later these men must be met and conquered.

I need not mention to one whose knowledge and experience in Indian affairs are so accurate as your own that halfway measures in dealing with the red man are not only inconclusive and pernicious in their results, but are always doubly expensive to the Government. The great distance to be traversed in operating against the upper bands is the most formidable obstacle to their speedy subjugation, but this must be overcome so far as it is possible.

I had progressed thus far with this dispatch when I had the honor to receive your instructions of 18th instant, fixing the general programme for the districts commanded, respectively, by General Sully and myself during the coming season. In obedience to your directions I proceed in as brief a space as possible to give you my views as to the location of the military posts contemplated by you.

First. About 80 miles a little southwest from Fort Abercrombie, and somewhat more than half that distance northwest from Big Stone Lake, is Re Ipahan, or the head of the Coteau de Prairie, an abrupt termination of the dividing ridge about midway between the valleys of the Red River and Minnesota and the James River, about 600 feet above the surrounding plain, and well supplied with good water and timber I regard it as the most commanding and eligible site for a military post in all that region. It can be reached and supplied with facility either from Fort Ridgely or Abercrombie. A strong force stationed there could readily operate toward the James or Cheyenne Rivers, while it would entirely protect the approach to Lake Traverse, Big Stone Lake, and the Minnesota Valley. The general impression is that the overland route to Idaho will pass within or south of the head of the Coteau. I therefore respectfully and earnestly recommend that a post be established at the point specified instead of at Devil's Lake, which would be extremely difficult of access and of comparatively little importance, as the Indians seem for the past year to have abandoned that region in consequence of the scarcity of game. There is no doubt that a military post on the northeastern extremity of Devil's Lake would have a good effect in breaking up the intercourse between the British half-breeds and the prairie bands of Sioux, but that position would be too remote from the Missouri River to be supplied from thence and must depend upon being furnished by way of Pembina and Saint Joseph.

I would also respectfully suggest that a post on the James River, on a west line from Pembina, would be untenable for the lack of timber. The main valley of the James, above the mouth of Snake River, is singularly destitute of wood. In fact, so far as my information extends, there is not a single point on that river, above the locality mentioned, where anything like a sufficiency of that indispensable article for a military station can be found. But on the Cheyenne River timber is abundant, and a post might be located a little north of a direct line west from Abercrombie, which would be within striking distance of the James River, and equally command the important valley of the Cheyenne, while it could be supplied with more facility and much less expense from Fort Abercrombie, or even from Fort Ridgely, than from the Missouri River. The Coteau of the Missouri is very much broken and is difficult to be traversed with loaded teams, and the farther north we proceed the more impracticable the country becomes. By occupying the points I have designated for military posts, all the essential conditions of protection to trains bound for the gold-bearing regions of Idaho would be fulfilled, while a complete check would be given to the advance of any large bodies of savages toward the settlements in Minnesota and Iowa by the valleys of the great streams, which are the usual avenues of approach from the upper prairies.

Second. I regard the establishment of a fort on the Missouri River, at or near the head of Burnt Boat Island, where the Indians were driven across that stream by my command in July last, as of great importance. The region surrounding it is the favorite hunting-ground of some of the powerful bands of the Yanktonnais Sioux, and there is a mutual descent to the river from each side, which makes it easy of access. It is by no means impossible that a further examination of the country will prove this to be the best crossing-place for overland expeditions. It has evidently been a favorite passageway of the Indians for generations.

While I concur fully in the general features of the operations you propose, I beg leave respectfully to suggest that the new cavalry regiment will not be in condition to be effective for many months to come. The material is for the most part very inexperienced and raw, a small part only being composed of volunteers from the First Regiment. It will be impossible to mount them before spring, and while they will be of essential service in protecting the frontier as already mentioned, I trust that you will secure the three cavalry companies coming home from the South, for active employment as a part of the expeditionary force.

My experience of last season fully confirms me in the conviction that in very long-continued marches, where grain forage cannot be obtained, American horses cannot be relied on to keep pace with infantry, without becoming so poor and out of condition as to render them comparatively useless in the rapid pursuit of the enemy. I therefore respectfully repeat my already expressed opinion, that the column intended for active movements should be composed principally of infantry, and that the three companies of cavalry be confined to its march and their strength husbanded as much as may be, so that the horses can in action overtake the ponies of the Indians, which could not be done with our poor animals during the last campaign. In conclusion, I would respectfully state that as I have in this district but two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, with one company of artillery, it will tax my resources to the utmost to carry into execution the contemplated plan of operations.

I do not include Hatch's battalion in my estimate, as I consider it indispensable that it should remain on our northern line under existing circumstances. Two companies at each of the three regular posts in this district will leave twenty-seven disposable companies, including the battery, for garrisoning the temporary stations along the extensive frontier, for establishing the two new posts, and for movements in the field. If you approve of my suggestions with regard to the retaining of three additional cavalry companies returning home on furlough from the South, I trust to be able to carry out your orders fully. I have just received important dispatches from Major Hatch and Father Andre which I will have the honor to communicate to you in my next dispatch, and which may affect to some extent future operations.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF MINN., DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST,
Saint Paul, Minn., February 11, 1864.
Maj. Gen. JOHN PORE, Milwaukee

GENERAL: On the 25th ultimo I had the honor to place before you at length my views of the military operations which would be required for the protection of the frontier of Minnesota and Iowa and of Dakota Territory, and I took occasion to state very emphatically my conviction that the programme marked out by you could not be successfully carried out with less than the full force now in this district. I telegraphed you yesterday that an order had been received by Major Nelson, superintendent of recruiting, from the General-in-Chief, directing the Second Regiment Minnesota Cavalry to be dispatched without delay to General Banks at New Orleans. That regiment was raised to replace the First Minnesota Mounted Rangers, lately mustered out of the service, the latter regiment having been authorized expressly for frontier defense.

I am thus left with Hatch's battalion of cavalry, alone of that force in the district, and I have already recommended that it remain where it is now stationed, for I regard a force near the British line as indispensable. I beg leave respectfully to state that while I shall cheerfully obey all orders from my superiors, it is my duty to report the expression of my conviction that if the Second Minnesota Cavalry is detached as ordered there will not be left in the district a force sufficient effectively to protect the frontier against the powerful bands of savages who inhabit the prairies within 200 or 300 miles of our own settlements, and who will promptly be informed, through the British half-breeds, of the very serious diminution of the military strength in this district.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HDQRS. DIST. OF MINN., DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST,
Saint Paul, Minn., February 16, 1864.

Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE, Milwaukee:

GENERAL: Since I had the honor to dispatch to you the application of the colonel commanding the Sixth Regiment Minnesota Volunteers, to be permitted to replace the First Regiment Minnesota Volunteers in the Army of the Potomac, I have learned from officers of the last-named regiment that there is little reason to hope for the reenlistment of the men whose term of service will expire on the 29th April next. In view of this fact I beg leave to withdraw the application of the Sixth Regiment, inasmuch as that amount of force cannot be spared from this district unless immediately replaced. The Second Minnesota Cavalry being ordered South, there will remain but two regiments of infantry, Hatch's battalion of cavalry, and an incomplete battery for operations on this extensive frontier.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding

HDQRS. DIST. OF MINN., DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST,
Saint Paul, Minn., March 21, 1864.

Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE, Milwaukee:

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that I have ordered Major Hatch to evacuate the post of Pembina as soon as practicable, and with his command to repair to Fort Abercrombie and relieve the garrison, composed of companies of the Eighth Regiment Minnesota volunteers, preparatory to the concentration of that regiment for other service. I have directed the movement to take place so that Major Hatch's battalion can reach Abercrombie on or before 20th April.

Two companies of the battalion will be employed during the summer in patrolling the country along the Red River, so as to guard that line of communication from interruption by the savages. I have telegraphed to you this morning that the superintendent of recruiting has received instructions to order Brackett's Minnesota battalion, now at Fort Snelling, to report to you, and asking you to telegraph orders with regard to them.

l am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HDQRS. DIST. OF MINN., DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST,
Saint Paul, Minn., April 9, 1864.
Maj. Gen. JOHN PORE, Milwaukee:

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of 4th instant. Your order prohibiting the departure of the Sixth Regiment Minnesota Volunteers until orders to the contrary are sent me from department headquarters will be complied with, and the detachments of that regiment now stationed along the outer defenses of the frontier will be directed to hold themselves in readiness to move as soon as marching orders reach them.

I cannot but believe that the latter part of your dispatch is based upon a misapprehension of the force in this district. Leaving the Sixth Regiment out of the estimate, I have under my command the Eighth Regiment Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, numbering about 800 effective men; the Second Minnesota Cavalry, about 1,050 men; Hatch's battalion, about 350 men; the Third Minnesota Battery, about 125 men; and the Invalid or Veteran Reserve Corps, numbering about 150. The first-named regiment (to be mounted), with eight companies Second Cavalry and two sections of the battery, say, 1,500 men, or perhaps 1,600, are to be dispatched in accordance with your directions to join General Sully. I shall then be left without any infantry force to establish the two posts in the interior, and the rest of the military strength specified will be barely sufficient to garrison the posts already in existence and guard the frontier against hostile raids.

Brackett's battalion is, of course, not embraced in the fore, going enumeration, it being under marching orders for Sioux City. Forts Abercrombie, Ripley, and Ridgely should not be garrisoned by less than two companies each, and the Veteran Reserve detachment will be required at Fort Snelling.

There are some exposed stations along the extensive line which should be occupied by small detachments, and to effect all these objects you will perceive I shall be left with a force all told of not more than one regiment of men. To enable me to carry out your plan for the establishment of the posts on James River and Devil's Lake the First Regiment should be ordered on duty in this district without delay. Its three years' term of service expires on 29th instant, when many of the veterans will be mustered out, leaving between 300 and 400, including recruits. The ranks can, I think, be filled up to the minimum, at least in time to enable me to dispatch a force sufficient for the two posts.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. H. SIBLEY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HDQRS. DIST. OF MINN., DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST,

Saint Paul, Minn., April 27, 1864.

Col. M. T. THOMAS.

Commanding First Sub-District,  Saint Cloud:

COLONEL: You will receive for your guidance a copy of the special order issued 26th instant, designating the forces to compose the column to join Brigadier-General Sully's command on the Missouri River. You will at once dispatch copies of so much of that order as may be necessary to those officers in your sub-district whose commands are embraced in it, so that there may be perfect concert of action when the period for concentration at Sauk Centre shall arrive. The troops in garrison who are specified as a part of the expeditionary forces will march to that point as they are successively relieved.

The stations at Pomme de Terre and Alexandria will be occupied by detachments of Major Hatch's battalion, that officer having already been so instructed. A small detachment will be left in garrison at Sauk Centre, probably not more than 25 or 30 men, and the post at Fort Ripley will be garrisoned by those men of your regiment who are not fit for active duty in the field, as specified in same order. The brigadier-general commanding depends upon you to exercise the strictest scrutiny in the examination of the several companies of your regiment, so that none be taken on the expedition but men in sound and healthy condition, so that the column be not encumbered on the march with invalids. The men left behind will be useful in performing indispensable garrison duty. Company F, of the Eighth Regiment, except such men as are required to secure the public property while in process of transportation from Princeton, will be dispatched in due time to aid in taking charge of the horses for the regiment, and it may be that detachments from other companies will also

be necessary for the same purpose. You will be duly notified on this point when the horses shall have been received at Fort Snelling.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. C. OLIN,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE NORTHWEST,

Milwaukee, Wis., April 30, 1864.

Brigadier-General SIBLEY:

I answered yesterday, by telegraph, your letter concerning the Sixth Regiment, which will not be withdrawn from Minnesota until the summer campaign is over. I do not understand your dispatch to Colonel Myers about delay in consequence of non-arrival of horses. One thousand have already reached you, and I presume 300 more, at least, will be in Saint Paul by the time this letter reaches you. Let us understand. You were to send 1,600 mounted men to Sully. A large part of this force is robe infantry, who will be mounted mostly, as I understand you, on horses turned in by the First Mounted Rangers (mustered out). About 2,000 horses are to go up to Saint Paul to mount Second Cavalry and Brackett's and Hatch's battalions.

You have now fully 1,000 horses besides those for Brackett. These, with the horses of the late mounted rangers, are nearly all that you need for the force you are to send to the Missouri. A week or so, more or less, is not of importance in remounting Hatch's battalion and the balance of the Second Cavalry. I cannot, therefore, see how a delay of a few days in forwarding the remainder of the horses can in the least affect the sending of the force to Sully. I am thus particular and urgent, general, because it is very essential that your force should reach Sully in time. I cannot endure the idea of delay, for which the views you present do not, in my judgment, contain any sufficient reason.

I have never supposed you would not do everything in your power, but I have a little feared that you are over particular and might possibly occasion delay by adhering to arrangements and to the completion of minute details which, although judicious, are not essential. In relation of the Sixth Regiment, it is proper for you to bear in mind the following views: Four companies of infantry are to establish the post at Devil's Lake and four companies on James River. Of course, as you send off nearly the whole Eighth Regiment mounted, these companies must come from the Sixth, but as soon as the campaign is over, the four companies of the Sixth at each of these posts are to be replaced by three companies at each post of the Eighth Regiment. Thus six companies of the Eighth will be left to garrison (as infantry) the posts at Devil's Lake and James River, relieving the companies of the Sixth. The other four companies of the Eighth, together with the eight companies of the Sixth, will then return to Minnesota, bringing with them all the horses upon which the infantry was mounted for the campaign. The whole of the Sixth Regiment will then be assembled and sent to its corps on the Potomac, leaving you for your district one regiment of infantry and one regiment and a battalion of cavalry. Of this force, you will have for Minnesota alone four companies of infantry and six companies of cavalry, a force more than you can use with good result behind the line of your large posts on Devil's Lake and James River. You will understand the necessity of not communicating any part of this information to 'any person whatever until the proper time comes to give the order. If the companies of the Sixth knew they were not to occupy the quarters at Devil's Lake and James River of course they would work reluctantly and slowly. They must not, therefore, know it until they are relieved by the companies of the Eighth.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

Major-General. Commanding.

HDQRS. DIST. OF MINN., DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST,

Saint Paul, Minn., May 7, 1864.

Col. M. T. THOMAS,

Commanding First Sub-District:

COLONEL: Your dispatch of 3d instant, covering one from Captain Butterfield, at Fort Abercrombie, has been duly received at these headquarters. General Sibley feels very deeply anxious at the threatened delay in relieving the companies of the Eighth by Major Hatch's battalion. If the companies at Fort Abercrombie, Pomme de Terre, and Alexandria cannot be relieved so as to reach Sauk Centre by 18th instant at latest, they must march across by Lake Traverse to meet the remainder of the column at Inkpa River, below Lacquiparle, which will be the point of departure from the waters of the Minnesota River across to the Missouri. It seems, however, hardly probable that these companies will not be able to concentrate at Sauk Centre before 18th instant.

The column must march from Camp Pope by 28th instant, so as to be able to leave the mouth of the Inkpa River by 1st June, in accordance with the understanding with Brigadier-General Sully. Everything needful is being dispatched to Fort Ridgely with all the rapidity practicable,except such stores as are requisite for the equipment of the Eighth Regiment at Sauk Centre and their subsistence on the march to Fort Ridgely. The cavalry equipments of the regiment, except such as will be required for the use of the men who will take up the horses, will be sent to Anoka today or on Monday, as they are here already. It is hoped that the transportation ordered by Captain Carling, chief quartermaster, to be furnished by Captain Kimball, assistant quartermaster, will be in readiness at Anoka to take the equipments and subsistence stores forward without delay. No time should be lost in pressing everything forward, as the orders of General Pope are peremptory that the column shall march

not later than the time designated. Captain McCoy, with his company and a detachment of 41 deserters from the rebel army, will leave on the 9th with 500 horses for the Eighth Regiment, and Captain Aldrich, with the portion of his company ordered down for that purpose, will take charge of the remainder and be dispatched as soon as possible. General Sibley depends upon your well-known energy to push matters forward with all expedition. The command at Fort Ripley should move at once to Sauk Centre in a direct line as soon as relieved by the enlisted men of your regiment not fit for field service, who, General Sibley supposes, will form a detachment of 50 or 60 men at least. Sixteen of the best men among the rebel deserters are assigned there also for garrison duty. You will order Lieutenant Harris to proceed without any delay to that post, and some officer will be detailed from these headquarters to assume the command.

Companies B and G, now at Ripley, and F, at Richmond, all of Second Regiment Cavalry, will accompany the Eighth Regiment from Sank Centre to Camp Pope, and to avoid the delay in taking the horses for Company G to Fort Ripley, Captain Nix will be directed to proceed directly to Sauk Centre with the horses for his company, and the remaining men can proceed overland with the rest of the companies at Fort Ripley to the point of concentration. So soon as you have placed everything in motion to accomplish the intended movements, and deem your presence at Saint Cloud no longer indispensable, you will report in person at these headquarters to receive your final instructions from the brigadier-general commanding. The Missouri River is represented to be in good condition for steamers, so that General Sully will not likely be delayed by low water, which fact renders the necessity of a speedy

movement by the cooperating column from this district so much the greater.

By command of Brigadier-General Sibley:

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. C. OLIN,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. DIST. or MINN., DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST,

Saint Paul, Minn., May 18, 1864.

Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE,

Comdg. Dept. of the Northwest, Milwaukee, Wis.:

GENERAL: I have the honor to state for your information that Major Hatch's battalion, after a long detention in awaiting the movements of the steamer on the Red River, where the water is at an exceedingly low stage, reached Frog Point, about 90 miles below Fort Abercrombie, on the 10th instant, from which the march would be made overland, so as to reach that point on 15th or 16th, in time to relieve the companies of the Eighth Minnesota Volunteers at Abercrombie, Pomme de Terre, and Alexandria, so that they with the remainder of the regiment will be enabled to concentrate at Fort Ridgely on 28th instant, the day designated for the assembling of the entire expeditionary force for the march to the Missouri.

I regret to be obliged to state that the whole country is parched up in consequence of unprecedented lack of rain at this season, and thus far there is hardly the appearance of grass upon the prairie, which may seriously impede the march of the column by the failing of the animals in strength, as a necessary result of want of forage. If the Missouri region has not been visited with more rain than we have, I have grave apprehensions lest the movements of Brigadier-General Sully be very much retarded. I trust that in no case will there be any failure in forwarding subsistence for the troops from this district to the designated point of juncture, as they will leave Fort Ridgely with but

thirty days' rations.

I have no advices from General Sully since he left Saint Louis for Sioux City. A part of the Sioux refugees, if not all, still remain in the British settlements about Fort Garry, and they avow their intention to do all the mischief they can to our people. The mail carrier was fired at on his way from Abercrombie to Pembina, about ten days since, by 2 Sioux, a ball passing through his clothes, and he only escaped by the speed of his horse. The mail was left behind by him and was found and burned by the Indians, the lock and other portions of the ironwork of the mailbag having been subsequently picked up by our men. My predictions of last winter of the course which would be pursued by these wretches, who were saved from starvation by British subjects only to renew their raid upon our settlements, are too apt to be realized, and I shall be happily disappointed if, as soon as the grass is sufficiently grown for purposes of concealment, they are not found renewing the outrages of 1862 on our frontiers, so far as they are permitted to do so unchecked.

Surely our Government owes it to our citizens who are exposed to the merciless cruelties of these monsters in human shape, along our extensive border, to insist that the British Government shall immediately adopt the most prompt and summary measures to restrain these outlaws from seeking a refuge from pursuit upon British soil. I shall dispose of the few troops I shall have at my disposal to cover the settlement as effectually as practicable, but it is evident that all exposed points cannot be guarded. I shall dispatch the four companies intended for the James River post as soon as possible after the departure of the expedition, and a like number to Cheyenne River, as you have directed. The stage of water is so very low that steamers do not attempt the Minnesota, and it is with great difficulty that any but small boats can ascend the Mississippi River to Saint Paul.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. H. SIBLEY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HDQRS. DIST. OF MINN., DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST,

Saint Paul, Minn., May 23, 1864.

Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE,

Comdg. Department of the Northwest, Milwaukee:

GENERAL: I have the honor to state that your dispatch of 18th instant reached me yesterday. I am glad to learn that you have given such instructions to Brigadier-General Sully as will insure the column from this district, ordered to join him on the Missouri, against any failure to meet with necessary supplies. I am glad to be able to state that notwithstanding the detention in the transfer of Hatch's battalion from Pembina to Fort Abercrombie, to relieve the troops there and at the small posts on this side, by reason of the extremely low stage of water in the Red River, the battalion arrived at the last-named post so as to enable the companies of the Eighth Regiment to march on 17th, so that the whole force will doubtless concentrate at Fort Ridgely in time for the departure of the column on 1st proximo, as agreed upon between General Sully and myself.

I propose to go up in person to that post in time to superintend the movement and satisfy myself of the efficient state of the command, and I shall therefore be absent eight or ten days, unless other important business shall present itself to interfere with my purpose. So soon as the expedition is fairly under way I shall forward the arrangements for the James River post, and to dispatch the detachment to the Cheyenne River with as much rapidity as possible. In regard to the Indians who have proposed to submit to the Government on the terms proposed them as heretofore communicated to you, I beg leave to state that no promise or intimation has been given them, on the part of the military authorities of this district or the special agents, that they would receive any remuneration from the' Government, except that I authorized Major Brown, as directed by you, to state to them that if requisite you would instruct me to furnish them with seed-corn.

I shall permit no interference on the part of any not directly connected with the military with these Indians. A portion of them, to the number of some 20 lodges, are now encamped near the scout's camp at Skunk Lake, as I have not deemed it safe or just to them to insist upon their removal to Devil's Lake, where they would doubtless encounter the hostility of the great body who are in favor of continuing the war, before the movement of the troops in that quarter will afford them the necessary protection. The whale number of the friendly disposed Sissetons, together with a part of the Cutheads in the same category, is not far from 200 lodges, but a large proportion of them are deterred from joining those who have already submitted by the threats of the hostile Sissetons and the Yanktonais. A decided success on the part of Brigadier-General Sully will much strengthen the ranks of the peace party, and proportionately weaken those who are now clamorous for war.

A just and conciliatory policy on the part of the military authorities can be made, with little or no expense to the Government, to eliminate the really guilty element from among these upper bands, so as to save those who have not participated willingly in the war against the Government from the destruction which now menaces them. But this can only be effected by disregarding entirely the system of treaty making which has heretofore obtained, and placing the Indians at some suitable spot at a remote distance from the frontier, under the direct guard and protection of the military, with the understanding that they must subsist themselves by their own exertions. A small sum to be expended for seeds would be all that would be requisite to insure them against actual want. The region along the upper Cheyenne River and Devil's Lake will not be required for the purpose of white settlements for half a century to come, and the land is good and well adapted for the residence of Indians.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. H. SIBLEY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE NORTHWEST,

Milwaukee, Wis., May 26, 1864.

Brig. Gen. H. H. SIBLEY,

Commanding District of Minnesota:

GENERAL: I sent you a dispatch this morning directing that the Sixth Minnesota proceed without delay to Helena. The disasters in Arkansas and Louisiana have been so serious, and the condition of affairs in that region so threatening, that the Secretary of War considers it essential that the Sixth be sent. We must therefore do the best we can without it.

You were authorized in my dispatch of this date to retain 400 men of Thomas' force. Of course we must for the present suspend the attempt to establish the post at Devil's Lake, but the post on James River must be begun as soon as we reasonably can.

It is altogether unlikely that Indian raids will continue more than a few weeks, and when they cease, as they doubtless will do soon after Thomas moves, I think you can readily resume the plan we have laid out. You will have four companies of the Second Cavalry, four of Hatch's battalion, and the 400 men you are authorized to withhold from Thomas. These will be enough, I am sure, to guard your frontier and to establish the post on James River. If we cannot do better, Sully's campaign (at least that portion of it east of the Missouri River) must be brought to an end in time for the proposed garrison for Devil's Lake, to transport its stores from the post on the Missouri and establish the post. We will, however, see about this as the season progresses.

The post on James River is a necessity, and I rely upon you to see that it is located as soon as practicable. We must do the best we can with the means left us and depend upon renewed energy and activity to accomplish our purposes. I shall send a copy of this letter to Sully, who will doubtless be as much disappointed as yourself.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Major-General, Commanding.

HDQRS. DIST. OF MINNESOTA, DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST,

Saint Paul, Minn., July 20, 1864.

Maj. C. P. ADAMS,

Commanding Hatch's Battalion, Present:

MAJOR: You will proceed without delay to take command of the corps known as Hatch's Independent Battalion, making your headquarters at Fort Abercrombie and relieving Capt. C. H. Mix in the command of that post. You will devote yourself assiduously to restore the discipline and morale of the battalion, which are represented unofficially to be in a very low state. General Sibley depends upon your exertions, aided by those of other officers, to bring the command into a condition of efficiency and entire subordination. The post of Fort Abercrombie is an exceedingly important one, and its commandant will be required to exercise a wise discretion in dealing with the questions which are continually arising outside of the routine of his duties inside of the garrison.

Copies of instructions heretofore given from these headquarters to Major Hatch and Captain Mix will be furnished you herewith for your guidance. You will bear in mind that the exercise of vigilance is absolutely necessary at so remote a post where the large amount of public property on hand is a great temptation to the hostile Sioux, who are in the habit of roaming through the country from Devil's Lake down the Cheyenne and along other tributaries of the Red River of the North, and who would not hesitate to assault the fort if a want of due caution on the part of the garrison or other contingency should lead them to believe they would succeed. You will be especially careful, should the post be visited by Indians under the semblance of peaceful intentions, to allow no opportunity of examining the defenses or obtaining other knowledge which would give them an advantage in case of attack.

The Chippewa Indians from Leech Lake and from other bands have lately manifested a desire to open communication with the Sioux camp, near the Big Bend of the Cheyenne, who have acceded to the terms of peace offered them by the Government, and are now encamped with the scouts. Their professed desire is peace, but it would be contrary to the plainest dictates of public policy to encourage any intercourse between the Sioux and Chippewas in any form whatever. You will, therefore, kindly but firmly intimate to any Chippewas who may be known as endeavoring to reach the Sioux camps that they will not be permitted to do so, but that they must confine themselves to the country in which they have hitherto lived and hunted.

There is an evident intention also on the part of the Chippewas to trespass upon the region of the upper Minnesota and its tributaries, from which the Sioux have been lately expelled. This should be prevented as far as practicable, for it not only affords facilities for conference with the Sioux, but is attended with constant danger of collision with the whites, most of whom cannot be expected to distinguish between Chippewas and Sioux. You will perceive that the policy of General Sibley is to discourage all attempts of the Chippewas to take advantage of the course of events, either in extending their area of hunting to country not belonging to them or in inaugurating new associations either with the whites or with the Sioux. Much will have necessarily to be left to your judgment in carrying out these intentions, so that while no harshness or ill usage can justly be complained of by these Indians on the part of the military, yet that they must be led to understand that the wishes of their great father, the President, must be listened to and obeyed. Under the orders of the major-general commanding the department ammunition is allowed to be taken through the country to the British possessions and to the settlements within our own boundary upon filing at these headquarters a proper bond that none of it shall be disposed of in any way to the Indians in arms against the Government. This being done, a permit is issued from these headquarters, which will, of course, be respected. There is said to be a suspicious individual among the Chippewas who was at Fort Abercrombie lately when a party of that tribe visited the post, and who encamped with some of the half-breeds near the fort. He is said to speak both the Sioux and Chippewa languages, is dressed in leather, and is altogether an astute and intelligent man. He is said to have been with those Indians since December last, and as he has no family connections with them and his conduct is singular in itself you will endeavor quietly to obtain evidence or information of his object in remaining in that part of the country. Should circumstances be such as to indicate that he is a rebel emissary, or engaged in any manner in stirring up disaffection among the Indians, you will not hesitate to arrest him, should he venture within reach of your command, and send him under guard to Fort Snelling, making a minute report of all the facts.

He is designated among the Chippewas by a name which signifies "the last comer," or "the man who comes last." The investigation into this man's conduct, &c.,must be prosecuted so quietly and carefully as to preclude all suspicion of the object, otherwise the individual, who is doubtless on the watch if he is really an improper character, would take the alarm and decamp. You will be expected to make frequent reports to these headquarters embodying all the information of importance you may obtain from time to time relative to the movements of the Indians, the general condition of things, &c. Captain Donaldson, commanding Company D of your battalion, has been assigned with his company to special service to patrol the region along the Red River and keep open the communication on that route.

By command of Brigadier-General Sibley:

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. C. OLIN,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

STATE OF MINNESOTA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

Saint Paul, August 31, 1864.

Brig. Gen. H. H. SIBLEY,

Commanding District of Minnesota, Saint Paul, Minn.:

SIR: I enclose, respectfully, a private communication(*) from General Mitchell, of Saint Cloud, confirming the report of Indian depredations in the vicinity of Manannah, &c. Judge Smith, who has just arrived from Forest City, saw a soldier on Monday from the front, who more than corroborated the report. I earnestly suggest the propriety of immediately dispatching Captain Boyd to that section of country with his company (E) of Hatch's battalion.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. MILLER, Governor of Minnesota.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE NORTHWEST,

Milwaukee, Wis., September 2, 1864.

Brig. Gen. H. H. SIBLEY,

Commanding District of Minnesota, Saint Paul:

GENERAL: Your dispatch of yesterday has been received and answered by telegraph. I suppose from its contents that the two companies to which it refers belong to Hatch's battalion and are designed to join and serve in the department, otherwise I would not in any manner interfere with them. If Governor Miller thinks more troops necessary in Minnesota he can himself telegraph the facts to the Secretary of War. After the numerous written statements made by prominent citizens of this region to the War Department, setting forth that a large force is unnecessarily kept in this department, and the inspections that have been made, based on these statements, it will not be proper for me to apply for more troops nor interfere with any being raised in this department for service elsewhere.

Many of the newspapers in the department, and especially those in your district, have constantly asserted that the fear of Indians was humbug, and these Indian expeditions a fraud upon the Government. For any consequences which result from the course they have pursued they must be responsible to the people of Minnesota. As soon as I can procure copies of the written statements referred to as having been made to the War Department I will forward them to you for publication, so that the people of the Northwest may know to whom they are indebted among their own citizens for the weak force on the frontier and the Indian raids to which they have been subjected in consequence.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

Major-General, Commanding.

HDQRS. DIST. OF MINNESOTA, DEPT. OF THE NORTHWEST,

Saint Paul, Minn., September 9, 1864.

Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE,

Comdg. Department of the Northwest, Milwaukee, Wis.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that dispatches from Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, commanding Independent Battalion, dated Fort Abercrombie, 4th instant, mention the arrival of a Mr. Fonseca from the British settlements near Fort Garry, on the Red River, who states that 350 lodges of Sioux Indians had arrived at the settlements, embracing 1,000 or 1,200 warriors. Their particular object is not known, it being the belief of some that they have come to ask the establishment by the Hudson Bay Company of a trading post at Turtle Mountain, on or near the boundary line, while others assert that they desire to visit Fort Abercrombie with a view to make peace. Colonel Adams has no faith in the latter supposition, but is impressed with the �9 R R--VOL XLI, PT III� conviction that they are seeking to supply themselves with ammunition to carry on the war against us, and the character of the bands composing the camp, if correctly designated, leads me to entertain the same opinion. A part, at least, of this force is from the camp which since last spring has been located near the Dog's Lodge, west of Devil's Lake, and of which I have several times advised you as containing an assemblage of the most desperate ruffians in the country. The camp at Dog's Lodge consisted of 400 lodges, and composed the den of thieves from which have issued the raiding parties who have from time to time visited our frontier. Lieutenant-Colonel Adams expresses some apprehensions lest the command of Captain Donaldson, engaged in patrol duty along the Red River toward Pembina, should be attacked, but I do not share them, but rather fear some forays from the young men upon the border settlements on the north of the Minnesota River.

Major Clowney reports from Fort Wadsworth, 30th ultimo, the safe arrival of Lieutenant Phillips and fifty men Second Minnesota Cavalry, who acted as escort to Captain Fisk's train from that post to the Missouri, and for whose safety I have expressed some solicitude. Captain Fisk gave a quasi order to Lieutenant Phillips to continue with him to the Yellowstone, which the latter very properly declined to obey, as it was in direct contravention of his orders from Major Clowney, given in accordance with instructions from me. Lieutenant Phillips made a report of his tour, copy of which will be made and sent for your information.

He fell in with a good many Indians who had papers from General Sully to hunt, and some of them informed our scouts that the country was swarming with hostile savages, cautioning them to beware of straggling far from the main body. On our immediate border everything is quiet, although rumors of Indians are rife as usual, to which I pay little attention.

Still, I shall not be surprised if the necessities of the several bands should impel them to a series of demonstrations along our extensive line, with a view to procure supplies of horses and other plunder before the setting in of winter. With the assistance of the two companies U.S. Volunteers and of the same number of Hatch's battalion, ordered to report to you, I shall be able, I trust, to repel and punish any such attempts.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
WAR DEPT., PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
 

July 27, 1864.
The GOVERNOR OF MINNESOTA,
Saint Paul, Minn.:

SIR: In compliance with your request you are hereby authorized to raise two additional companies for Hatch's battalion of cavalry, but without any condition as to place of service. The term of service will be for either one, two, or three years, as recruits may elect. The recruitment, organization, and musters into service will be in accordance with the existing regulations of the War Department. The companies must be mustered in and ready for service by September 5, 1864, in order that the men may be credited on the quota of the State under the call of the 18th instant, and should they not be completed by that date, will be consolidated or assigned to duty with the other companies. Bounties will be paid in accordance with Circular No. 27, current series, from this office.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JAS. B. FRY,
Provost-Marshal- General.